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ABSTRACT
We study a modelofeconomic growth anddevelopment with a threshold externality. The model
has onesteady state with a low and stagnant level ofincome per capita and another steady state
with ahigh and growing level ofincome per capita. Both ofthese steady states are locally stable
under theperfect foresight assumption. We introduce learning into this environment. Learning
acts as an equilibrium selection criterion andprovides an interesting transition dynamic between
steady states. We find that for sufficiently low initial valuesof human capital-values that would
tend to characterize preindustrial economies-the system under learning spends a long period of
time (an epoch) in theneighborhood ofthe low income steady statebefore finally transitioning to
a neighborhood of the high income steady state. We urge that this type of transition dynamic
providesagood characterization ofthe economic growth and development patterns that havebeen
observed across countries.
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Pittsburgh, PA 15260-17331 Introduction
1.1 Development facts
A well-known fact in the history of economicdevelopment is that prior to industrialization,
all of today’s highly developed economies experienced very long periods, epochs,.ofrelatively
low and stagnant growth in per capita income. Maddison (1982, Table 1.2) reports average
annual compound growth rates in per capita GDP for sixteen of today’s highly developed
countries.1 These growth rates were 0.0 percent for the years 500-1500, 0.1 percent for the
years 1500-1700, and 0.2 percent for the years 1700-1820. It was only after industrialization,
during the period 1820-1980, that these countries achieved a significantly higher average
annual compound growth rate of 1.6 percent. While these data are highly aggregated and
necessarily involve some guesswork, few economists would question the picture they paint.
Consideringthe more recentdata, the dominant fact is that there is alargeand persistent
disparity in levelsof per capita income across nations. Parente and Prescott (1993) use the
Summers and Heston (1991) data set and report that for a sample of 102 countries over
the years 1960-1985, per capita income in the richest 5 percent of the countries was about
29 times per capita income in the poorest 5 percent of countries. The poor countries grew,
on average, about as fast as the rich countries, so that this disparity has remained roughly
constant over the 1960-85 period.
In an effort to explain sustained differencesingrowth rates across economies across time,
andalso to explain the vast differences in levels of per capita income across nations that we
observe today, a number of authors have recently expanded upon the endogenous growth
literature pioneered by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) by building models that possess
multiplesteady states for the growth rate of per capita output.2 In these models, lowgrowth
steady states, sometimes referred to as poverty traps, are used to characterize preindustrial
or less developed economies. These low growth steady states coexist with high growth
steady states that are used to characterize industrialized or highly developed countries.
While these models have certain advantages over the one-sector neoclassical growth model
‘The sample consistsof Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S.
2See for example Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Azariadis
and Drazeri (1990), Matsuyama (1991), and Laitner (1995) among others.
1in the sense that they allow for sustained differences in growth rates across economies, this
improvement comes at some expense: these models cannot explain how countries initially
in poverty traps are ever able to make the transition to a high development steady state.
Indeed, poverty traps are modeled as absorbing states from which no economy can escape.
Furthermore, it is some exogenous factor, typically history or expectations, that determines
whether a country will beat the low or high development steady state for all time. Yet, as
Maddison’s (1982) data clearly reveals, sixteen of today’s most highly developed economies
were in a poverty trap for many hundreds of years! These countries were nevertheless
eventually able to industrialize and achieve a higher state of development.
In this paper we study a model that gives rise to sustained differences in growth rates
across countries for long periods of time but that also allows countries that are initially
near or at low growth steady states to eventually makethe transition to high growth steady
states. The model can also account for the phenomenon that countries with similar initial
conditions may experience quite different development paths, so that an observer of the
world situation at a point in time might see countries with vastly different levels of per
capita income.
1.2 Summary of the model
We study a version of agrowth model emphasizing athreshold externality dueto Azariadis
and Drazen (1990). Physical capital is accumulated in a standard way, but human capital
accumulation is subject to increasing returns. Agents make two decisions when young: how
much to save by renting physical capital to firms, and how much to invest in training. The
returns to training depend positively on the economy-wide average level of human capital.
The model admits two steady states. The first is associated with low and stagnant levels
for physical capital, human capital and output per capita, and is characterized by agents
who choose not to invest in training when young. We call this the low income steady state.
The second steady state has higher and growing levels for these per capita variables, and
is characterized by agents who choose to devote a positive fraction of their available time
endowment to training when young. We call this the high income steady state. Each of these
steady states is locally stable under a perfect foresight assumption so that, in particular,
2the low income outcome is an absorbing state.3
We introduce learning into this environment. Agents no longer have perfect foresight
and instead must learn which decision rules return the highest utility in the environment
they face. We model learning using Holland’s (1975) genetic algorithm, a stochastic, di-
rected search algorithm based on principles of population genetics.4 We interpret genetic
algorithm learning as auseful representation of trial-and-error learning which has important
advantagesover many other models in the literature—chief among these for our purposes is
that the genetic algorithm offers a natural model for experimentation by agents. We con-
duct computational experiments in order to characterize how a population of heterogenous
agents might eventually find their way to the high development steady state.
1.3 Main findings
Our main finding is that for initially low levels of human capital per capita—levels that
would tend to characterize preindustrial economies—our population of artificial agents
spends many generations (an epoch) in a neighborhood of the low income steady state
before finally making the transition to the high income steady state. We argue that this
provides an account of the development fact documented by Maddison (1982) that today’s
richest countries were oncestagnant for hundreds ofyears. We further demonstrate that ini-
tially identical economies might have very different development experiences in this model,
in the sense that industrialization might occur at radically differenttimes. The timing isim-
portant since different dates of industrialization imply very different post-industrialization
levels of per capita income across economies in this model. We argue that this result helps
explain another development fact, the present wide and persistent disparity in levels of per
capita income documented by Parente and Prescott (1993~and others.
1.4 Recent related literature
Our approach of usingan evolutionary learning dynamic to achieveaPareto superior steady
state in amodel with multiplesteady states is similar to that of Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993), who introduce evolutionary learning processes into a class of static 2 x 2 stage
3We could have allowed for more than two steady states, but we elected to study a stylized two-steady-
state case in this paper in order to discuss the main ideas in the clearest possible way.
4For an introduction to genetic algorithms, see Goldberg (1989) or Michalewicz (1994).
3games. But we introduce an evolutionary algorithm into a dynamic general equilibrium
model, wherethere is feedback from beliefs to outcomes and vice versa. The games Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) study lack this kind offeedback. In addition, in our model learning
interacts with athreshold externality, amechanism that is not part of the Kandori, Mailath
and Rob (1993) model.
The recent literature on growth and development is large and cannot be effectively
summarized here. But the idea of multiple stationary equilibria has been a popular theme,
and important contributions include Murphy, Shliefer and Vishny (1989) formalizing a big
push argument; Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990) on how fertility and human capital
accumulation might interact to influence development; and Azariadis and Drazen (1990)
formalizing a threshold argument. We work in this paper within the latter framework, but
our approach could in principle be applied to describe transitions in these other frameworks
which emphasize alternative mechanisms. Coodfriend and McDermott (1995) build an
endogenous growth model that involves transitions from premarket to market and from
preindustrializedto highly developed economy. These authors also havemultiple stationary
equilibria, but this fact plays an important role only in their explanation of the transition
from premarket to market economies; their explanationofindustrialization relies on asingle,
evolvingsteady state. Our approach might be usefulin helping explain the former transition.
This paper is alsorelated to the macroeconomics learning literature, which has recently
been surveyed by Sargent (1993). One aim of this literature has been to use learning
processes to select equilibria in models with multiplerational expectations equilibria. Our
analysis is relatively novel in this literature in that our model involves capital accumulation.
In addition, agents here are learning, simultaneously, about two decision rules—how much
to save and howmuchto invest in training—incontrast to previous learning analyses, where
agents are typically concerned with learning about asingle decision rule.
Finally, we note that genetic algorithms and other computational techniques involving
artificial intelligence are increasingly being employed by economists as a way of modelling
the behavior of economic agents. A partial list of recent references includes Andreoni and
Miller (1995), Arifovic (1994, 1995ab), Arthur (1994), Binmore and Samuelson (1992),
Bullard and Duffy (1994, 1995), Durlauf (1995), Holland and Miller (1991), Marimon,
McGrattan and Sargent (1990), Miller (1989), Routledge (1994), Sargent (1993), Tesfatsion
4(1995) and Wright (1995).
The rest ofthe paper is organized as follows. In section two we outline the modelthat we
employ in the restofthe paper. We close the model under perfect foresight and characterize
the set of stationary equilibria. In section three, we introduce our genetic-algorithm-based
learning algorithm. Section four explainsthe designand results of oursets of coinputational
experiments, and section five concludes.
2 A model of growth and development
2.1 Preferences and technology
We use a version of a model of economic growth and development due to Azariadis and
Drazen (1990). Time t is discrete and takes on integer values on the real line. There is a
single, perishable good that is both consumed andused as an input into production. Agents
in this economy live for two periods which we label “young” and “old.” At every date t
there is a total population of2N agents, where N is a positiveinteger, with the population
equally divided between young andold. There is no population growth. We usethe notation
that subscripts denote birthdates and parentheses denote real time, while individual agents
within a generation are indexed by a superscript iE(1,2, ..., N). Aggregate variables have
no subscript or superscript.
Agents are endowedwith one unit of time at every date t. During the first period oflife,
young agents may choose to spend some fraction, r~(t) [0, 1), of their time endowment in
training. There is a common training technology, denoted h (r~(t),x(t)), which all agents
can access, where the variable x(t) is the average quality of labor of both the young and
the old at time t:
x(t) = 1N1N
This variable is measured as efficiency units per unit time worked. An individual agent can
devote time to training when young in order to receive more efficiency units in the second
period of life via
x~(t+1)= h(r(t),x(t))x(t).
The key feature of the model is that the individual agent’s return to training depends
positively on the economy-wide average level of efficiency units. We follow Azariadis and
5Drazen (1990) and specify h(.) as
h(r(t),x(t)) = 1+~(x(t))r(t).
However, wedepart from Azariadis and Drazen (1990) in that we use a specific parametric
form for ~y(.),the private yield on human capital. In particular, we use the sigmoid function
A A
‘y (x(t)) = 1 + e~(t) — 2
which is strictly increasing in x(t) and implies the bounds given by ‘y(O) = 0 and
lim ~ (x(t)) =
x(t)-~.oo 2
Eachyoung agent inherits the average level of efficiencyunits in the economy inthe previous
time period. Youngagents combinethis endowment withatraining decisionr~(t)inorder to
receive x~(t + 1). Because weallow within generation heterogeneity in the decision variable
r~(t),the accumulation equation forx(t) is given by
x(t + 1) = x(t) [1 + ‘y (x(t)) f(t)]
wheref = ~ ~i 4(t).
Output per unit of effective labor is produced according to a neoclassical production
function which we specify as
f (k(t)) =
where ~ E (0, 1) and k(t) is the capital to effective labor ratio.5 Effective aggregate labor
is given by
NN
L(t) = [N - ~4(t)] x(t) +
so that
k(t) = K(t)
[N — ~1~i 4(t)] x(t) + ~
5We could include exogenous labor-augmenting technological change and population growth, but these
factorswouldexogenously increase the output growth rate in both steadystates and only serve to complicate
the analysis. For this reason we follow Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and abstract from these factors by
assuming a constant population and astatic technology.
6where K(t) denotes the aggregate physical capital stock. The rental rate on physical capital
and the wage are given by, respectively:
r(t) = ak(t)~’
w(t) = (1 — a)k(t)~.
There is also aconsumption loan market with gross rate of interest denoted R(t). Arbitrage
equates the rate of return ~orenting physical capital with the rate ofreturn on consumption
loans via R(t) = r(t + 1) + 1 — 6, where 6 is the net depreciation rate on physical capital.
In this paper we assume S = 1.~
All agents in this economy have the same preferences, U = inc~ (t) + inc~ (t+ 1). Fur-
thermore, all agents face the same lifetime budget constraint:
c~(t) + ~~ (i — r~(t))x(t)w(t) + [1 + ‘y (x(t))r~~(t)} x(t)w(t + 1)
2.2 Equilibria under perfect foresight
In this subsection, we assume that agents have perfect foresight. Combining the first order
conditions with the budget constraint, and making use of the definitions for w(t) and R(t),
the individual young agent’s optimal savings decision can be written as:
s~(t) = (1 — 4(t))x(t)(1 — a) k(t)a — [1 + y(x(t)) 4(t)] x(t)(1 — a)k(t + 1).
Young agents are equally endowed with x(t), and under perfect foresight they all make the
same choicesfor4(t), which we call r(t). Thus, aggregate saving is given by 8(t) = Ns~(t).
The market clearing condition is that K(t +1) = S(t). Some manipulation yields
k(t + 1) — g(t + 1) (1 — r(t)) a(1 — a) k(t)~ 1
- [1+ ~ (x(t)) r(t)] [g(t + 1)2a(2- T(t + 1)) + (1- a)g(t)]
where g(t + 1) [1 + ~y(x(t + 1)) r(t + 1)] x(t + 1). We now consider steady states of this
system.
First, suppose that r(t) = = 0 Vt. In this case, x(t) must be constant for all t. It
follows from (1) that in this case
~ [a(1—a)1T~
~ 1+3a j
6The assumption that capital depreciates fully each period is not necessary to our results, it merely
simplifies our analysis.
7The pair (r, k) is the low income steady state of our system.
Next, suppose that r(t) = ~ 0. In this case, x(t) is growing so that for t large enough
~y(t) —~ ~, and furthermore arbitrage requires that R = = ak’~’.Then
and it follows from (1) that r~must solve
— [ (1—r)a(1—a) ]T±~
- Ui + ~r] [3a - 2ar +1]
This is aquadratic in -r, but only oneof the two roots is feasible (i.e. there is only one value
for ‘r [0,1)), and this is the root we choose for r1~.The pair (r~,k~)constitutes the high
income steady state inthis system.
it is straightforward to show that the low income steady state is locally stable in the
perfect foresight dynamics, and that the high income steady state is saddlepath stable.
Azariadis and Drazen (1990) argued that initial conditions would determine which steady
state a nation might ultimately achieve, and that given a sufficiently diverse set of initial
conditions, an observer might see nations in persistently low as well as persistently high




We alter this model by assuming that individuals no longer have perfect foresight and
instead must learn about whidh decision rules work best in this environment. The agents
are nowinitially heterogeneous with respect to, first, the fraction of time that they spend
in training, 4(t) [0, 1), and second, the fraction of their time t wealth that they save.
If we denote this savings fraction by ç~ (t) [0,1), we can write a typical agent’s youthful
savings as
s’~(t) = ~(t)w(t) (i — 4(t)) x(t).
We model learning using a genetic algorithm, which we view as a useful model of trial-
and-error learning. The genetic algorithm acts on a population of chromosomes, or strings,
8which are typically binary representations ofimportant variables in the system to be studied.
In our application, each binary string completely characterizes the decision rules of an
individual agent. Strings are evaluated according to a fitness criterion, which in economic
models is naturally taken to be a utility function. An iteration of the algorithm involves the
application of genetic operators. The first operator is reproduction: strings are evaluated
for fitness, and the better strings are propagated, while the poorer strings are eliminated.
Asecond operator is crossover: new strings are created by splicing parts ofexisting strings
together. A third operator is mutation, with which very small portions ofstrings are altered
with small probability. Over time, the algorithm is expected to evolve strings that have, on
average, higher fitness than previous generations of strings.
3.2 Representation
As a preparatory step to implementation of the genetic algorithm, we encode the population
of N agents’ decision rules using binary strings. The two decision variables, 4(t) and ~(t),
for each agent are encoded in a single bit string of length £ > 0, where £ is an even integer.
The first £/2 bits represent the agent’s r~(t)decision and the next £/2 bits represent the
agent’s 44(t) decision. Let us suppose that initially, these bits are chosen randomly, with
each bit position in the string set equal to a zero or aone with probability .5. For example,
if we have £ = 30, an individual agent’s decision string might look like this:
000101010011011010001101110101
The first and last 30/2 = 15 bits are decoded to obtain two base ten integer values:
~0010101001101l~ p10001101110101,
2715 9077
These integers are then divided by the maximum integer value possible, a string with 15
bits all equal to 1, plus one, which is 2’~= 32768:~
= .0828552 = 4(t), ~ = .277008 = 44(t).
7We add one so that neither fraction can be equal to unity. If either r~(t)or ~(t) is equal to one, the
consumption c~(t)for that agent iszero, implying utility of—no. This causesa slight computational problem
which we avoid by using 32768 instead of 32767.
9Once we have 4> and T values for each of the N young agents, we can calculate each of these
agent’s savings decisions, s~ (t), and we can find aggregate savings:
N
8(t) = ~s~(t).
From the market clearing condition, we then findthe capital to effective labor ratio, and we
use that in turn to determine the interest rate and the wage. We can use this information to
evaluate whichdecision rules are performing better andsubsequently update the population
of strings using the genetic algorithm.
3.3 Fitness
In the artificial intelligence literature, fitness measures how well a string performs relative
to other strings. Our criterion is lifetime utility U~ = inc~(t) +lnc~(t+ 1). We wish to be
able to measure the fitness of any string in the system at time t. In order to do this, we
ask the following question of each string: how well would this string have performed ifit
had beenin use one period ago?8 We view the individual agent as atomistic, and therefore
incapable of significantly altering the level of endogenous aggregate variables in the system.
Accordingly, we use past data from the system on the interest rate, the level of human
capital, and the wages that the string would have faced ifit had been in use in the previous
period. From this we can determine how much consumption and therefore how much utility
a particular string would have garnered had it been in use in the previous period. This
utility level constitutes the fitness of astring.
3.4 Genetic operators
3.4.1 Reproduction
At the end of period t, webegin to choose the nextgeneration of N young agents whowill be
born at time t +1 by applying areproduction, or selection, operator. Reproduction involves
N binary tournaments. We begin by choosing two strings at random with replacement from
the entire population of strings—those belonging to both young and old agents—in use at
time t. We then compare fitness values; the winner of the tournament is the string with
8Some strings were in use one period in the past, of course, so that this question might seem a little
redundant. We phrase the question this way only to emphasize that we ask the same question of every
string in the system at time t in order to evaluate all strings on an equal basis.
10the higher fitness value. This string is copied into the newborn generation. The binary
tournament process is repeated N — 1 more times, yielding a population of decision rules
that are, on average, more fit than the decision rules in use at time t.
3.4.2 Mutation
Following reproduction based on relative fitness, we subject all N of the candidate strings
that were winners of the N binary tournaments to some mutation. Mutation is performed
on a bit~by—bitbasis with some fixed probability, ptm > 0. If mutation is to be performed
on a bit, the bit value is changed from b to 1 — b.
3.4.3 Crossover
The final genetic operator is crossover. The crossover operator works on the population of
strings that result from selection and mutation. First, each of these N strings is randomly




With some fixed probability, pC > 0, two random integers are drawn, drawl, draw2
(1,£12). Using these numbers, the two strings are then cut at two points-one point within
the first £/2 bits and one point within the last £/2 bits. For example, if drawl = 3, and
draw2 = 9, the two strings in our example would be cut as follows:
0101101000101110 1011100101111101
000llOllOOlOllOl 001101100] 101111
The string portions to the right of each cut would then be swapped (the substrings repre-
senting each decision are kept separate), and the two strings are then recombined:
01010110010110l1011 10010101111
000lOl000lOlll000llOl 100111101
11The result is two new strings, possibly representing decision rules that have never appeared
in the system before.9
The N strings resulting from selection, mutation and crossover become the new young
generation alive at time t +1. The young agents alive at time t become the old agents alive
at time t+1, and the old agents alive at time t cease to exist (their strings are deleted).
The process is repeated in order to generate a time series for the artificial economy.
3.5 Interpreting genetic operators
The reproduction, mutation, and crossover operators have a simple economic interpreta-
tion. Being ‘born’ in this economy means leaving one’s formative years and entering the
productive portion of one’s life. These newborn agents just leaving their formative years
initially have no plans for the future-they are ‘blank slates.’ They acquire the decision
rules they will need by communicating with a few other members of society, those either
oneor two generations ahead ofthem. This communication is modeled via the reproduction
operator. in our implementation, each newborn agent communicates with two randomly
selected members of the society. The newborns evaluate the decision rules that belong to
these two older agents by calculating how much utility the rules would have delivered had
they beenin use one period in the past. Each newborn then copies the decision rule of the
two that would have delivered the most utility. This completes the first step in attaching a
decision rule to each of the incoming members of the society. But the newborns communi-
cate further when they talk with each other andcontemplate alternative decision rules that
might not be in use in the society at that time-that is, the newborns conduct a mental
experiment with other possible decision rules. This additional communication is modeled
via the crossover and mutation operators. In our implementation, the newborns are paired
and each pair creates two new decision rules by combining parts of their existing rules and
also by randomly changing smallparts ofthe recombined decision rules. Thus the incoming
generation learns from the experience of the agents older than themselves and can also be
innovative in introducing new decision rules into society.
9The addition of crossover serves to speed convergence somewhat, but it is the constant mutation rate,
pm > 0, rather than the crossover operation that is responsible for our main results. We note that while
crossover may serve to speed convergence, it has little effect when the economy is in the neighborhood ofan
equilibrium; in this case, strings are already nearly identical and so crossover plays almost no role in altering
strings.
123.6 Some advantages ofgenetic algorithm learning
We interpret the genetic algorithm as a useful model of trial-and-error learning. This ap-
proach to learning has some important advantages relativeto other modelsin the literature.
First, there is considerable heterogeneity across agents, afeature not often modeled in the
learning literature to date.’0 Second, the information requirements on agents are minimal,
as theyneedto know very l~ittle to functionwell inthe economy. Third, the geneticalgorithm
offers a natural model for experimentation by agents with alternative decision rules, an im-
portant characteristic of learning also rarely modeled in competitive general equilibrium
environments in the literature to date. Fourth, the heterogeneity of beliefs allows parallel
processing to be an important feature of the economy. That is, some agents are trying one
decision rule while other agents are trying other decision rules, with the better decision rules
propagating and the poorer ones dying out. We think this is closely akin to what goes on in
actual economies, where communication among agents encourages successful strategies to
be quickly copied and unsuccessful ones to be discarded. Fifth, genetic algorithm learning
has been shown in other research (e.g. Arifovic (1994, 1995ab)) to successfully mimic the
behavior of human subjects in controlled laboratory settings. And finally, the initial het-
erogeneity of the population allows us to initialize the system randomly,so that we are able
to obtain some sense of the “global” properties of our system under learning as opposed to
the local analysis that is often employed in the learning literature.” These features suggest
that genetic-algorithm-based models of learning have interesting economic content.
4 Design of computational experiments and results
4.1 Calibration
In order to examine the behavior of our genetic-algorithm-based learning system, we con-
ducted a large number of computational experiments. These experiments required us to
choose parameterizations and initial conditions for our model which we now describe.
‘°Foran alternative approach to systems with heterogeneous learning rules, see Evans, Honkapohja, and
Marimon (1994).
“In this paper, we use the term “global” to describe our analysis because it is based on a random
initialization scheme. We recognize thatour analysis is not trulyglobal, evencomputationally speaking, since
we did not complete multiple experiments based onevery possible initialization for agiven parameterization.
Such an approach is beyond the scope ofthis paper.
13There is a single parameter in the preferences andtechnology portion of the modelthat
must be set: physical capital’s share of output, a. We set a = .36, a value that can be
derived from postwar U.S. national income andproduct accounts, where consumer durables
are counted as capital. By using this value, the high income steady state of the model is
consistent with postwar experience on physical capital’s share in the U.S. economy.
Asingle parameter, A, controls the returns to investing in human capital. These returns
are partly endogenous since they depend on x(t), but for largex(t), ‘5’ = ~. We set A = 50,
implying ‘5’ = 25. This choice implies an endogenously determined high income steady state
value for the fraction of time devoted to training of approximately r~ = .22. Ifwe interpret
the time period in the model as being on the order of 25 years, the compound annual rate
of return in the high income steady state is about 13.7 percent, and the amount of time
devoted to training is about 5~years. We could reduce the high income steady state rate of
return, which is higher than most estimates ofthe postwar U.S. average, by choosinga lower
value for A, but this would mean a lower value for the amount of time devoted to training.
If one views, say, high school education as part of the time devoted to training in modern
economies, then 5~ years may already be too low. Our value of A strikes a compromise on
these competing aims.
We look to the artificial intelligence literature to set the parameters of the genetic
algorithm. The minimal number of strings for effective search is usually taken to be 30, but
we used a somewhat higher value of 50 for our application. This means that there are 50
agents per generation in our model, and the total population is 100. We set chromosome
length £ = 30, with £/2 = 15 bits devoted to each of the decisions the agents face when
young. String length is unimportant except as it determines the grid over which the agents
can search for an optimal value. By setting the substring length to 15 bits, we effectively
created a two-dimensional grid with (32,767)2 locations over a unit square and required
the agents to choose optimal values on the grid. We set the probability of crossover, pC,
equal to .95, and we set the probability of mutation, ptm, equal to .0022. These values are
close to those recommended by Grefenstette (1986). We now turn to the design of our
computational experiments.
144.2 Experiment set A: the effects ofinitial conditions
4.2.1 Design of experiment set A
We firstconsider the effectsof different initial conditions on the behavior of the system under
learning. Our model has initial conditions for the per capita stock of human capital, x, the
capital to effective labor ratio, k, the average initial fraction of time devoted to training, r,
and the average initial sayings fraction, 4>. We chose five feasible initial values for each of
these four variables and simulated the system once for each possible combination of these
five initial conditions. This yields 625 computational experiments, each with a different set
of initial conditions. We conducted each experiment for 250 iterations and calculated the
average of the last ten values of r, denoted by f, and the average of the last ten values of
the capital to effectivelabor ratio k, denotedk. Let us denote by k* and y* the equilibrium
levels ofthe capital-to-effectivelabor ratio andthe training fraction atthe two steady states.
We examined the data to see if Ik* — J~ <.002 and ]r* — ~j< .02 at date t. If this criterion
was met, we say that the system was in a neighborhood of that particular equilibrium at
date t.
We chose the set of initial conditions as follows. Interesting initial x values are at or
belowz(0) = .1, the value of x(0) which puts ‘y(x) at 5 percent of ‘5’. We chose one initial
x(0) valuehigher than this and three lower; accordingly, weused five values of x(0) (.0001,
.001, .01, .1, 1). We set initial capital to effective labor ratios k(0) relative to steady state
values according to k(0) (.5k~,k~,.5kg + .5kf~,k~,1.5kg). Average initial T and average
initial savings fractions 4> can range between zero and one. We chose 5 different values for
each of these initial fractions in order to cover the whole range of possibilities: r, 4> (.1,
.3, .5, .7, .9). However, actual initial values forr and 4> are only approximately equal to our
targeted values, dueto the way in which we initialized strings.’2
We call this set of 625 computational experiments “experiment set A.”
‘2Our initialization procedureworked as follows. Ifwe wanted to initialize r and 4 so they were, say, both
equal to .1, we would choose each bit value in each string by first choosing a random number from .01 to
1.00; ifthe random number was less than or equal to .1, we would place a bit value of 1 in that spot in the
string, otherwise, we would place a bit value of0. Since we only have 50 agents in each young generation,
our initial values for r and 4’ are only approximately equal to our targeted initial values of .1,.3,.5,.7,.9.
This approximation is not material to our results.
154.2.2 Results from experiment set A
One of the main results from experiment set Ai sthat, depending on the settings of the
initial conditions, neighborhoods of either of the two steady states can obtain at a point in
time, which we set to 250 iterations. Persistent mutation is the only source of variability
in these neighborhoods. A typical time series from this set of 625 experiments reveals that
the system initially fluctuates but then settles down to a neighborhood of either the low
income or the high income steady state. These systemsthen remain in these neighborhoods
for the remaining iterations. Figure 1 provides asample time series from one experiment
where the system achieved a neighborhood of the low income steady state and remained
there through iteration 250.
A second key result from experiment set A is that, among the initial conditions, the
initial level of human capital per capita, x(0), is the dominant determinant of the behavior of
the system at iteration 250. Forlow values ofx(0), wefindthe systems are in aneighborhood
of the low income steady state at iteration 250, while for high values of x(0), we find the
systems are in a neighborhood of the high income steady state at iteration 250. Other
initial conditions only influence this outcome for borderline values of x(0). This result is
interesting since preindustrial economies tendto be characterized by especially low levels of
human capital per capita. Our model therefore predicts that these preindustrial economies
will spend a long period of time, an epoch, in a neighborhood of the low income steady
state.
Figures 2abcillustrate the importance of the initial level of x(0). In each of these three
figures, k(0) = .001989, but the results are the same for other values of k(0). What varies
in these three figures are the initial levels of x(0). In Figure 2a, x(0) = .001, in Figure
2b, x(0) = .01 and in Figure 2c, x(0) = .1. In all three figures, the initial average fraction
of wealth saved is plotted on the horizontal axis, and the initial average time devoted to
training is plotted on the vertical axis. The actual initial average values for -r and 4> are
indicated by the placement of the labels Low or High in each of these figures. These labels,
Low and High, indicate whether our system had achieved neighborhoods around either the
low or high income steady states of the model after 250 periods of model time. In Figure
2a, where x(0) = .001, the system is in aneighborhood of the low income steady state after
16250 iterations for all initial values for average r and 4>. For x(0) = .01, as illustrated in
Figure 2b, the system has achieved the high income steady state after 250 iterations in only
3 out of the 25 different combinations for initial average r and 4>. Notably, the 3 instances
in which the system had achieved the high income steady state were all cases forwhich the
initial level of average r was quite high to begin with (approximately .9), so that at least
early on in the development process, there was asignificant accumulation of human capital.
This greater initial accumulation of human capital together with a higher initial stock of
human capital x(0) = .01, perhaps along with some helpful mutations, enabled the system
to achieve the high income steady state. But Figure 2c demonstrates that this is simply a
borderline situation. In Figure 2c x(0) .1, and the system achieves a neighborhood of the
high income steady state after 250 iterations for all 25 combinations of initial average r and
4>. The only important difference between Figures 2a and 2c is the initial level of human
capital per capita, x(0). Thus, we see that the initial level of the stock of human capital
plays a dominant role relative to other initial conditions. If x(0) is relatively low, then we
observe that the system is in a neighborhood of the low income steady state at model time
250 regardless of other initial conditions, while if x(0) is relatively high, we observe that
system is in aneighborhood ofthe high income steady state at model time 250, regardless of
other initial conditions. This result holdsacross other values of k(0), which is heldconstant
in Figures 2abc. Further confirmation was obtained for the two other values for x(0) that
we considered, x(0) = .0001 and x(0) = 1. The case where x(0) = .0001 is qualitatively
similar to the case where x(0) = .001, meaning that these 125 experiments were without
exception in a neighborhood of the low income steady state at iteration 250. Similarly, the
case where x(0) = 1 is qualitatively similar to the casewhere x(0) = .1, because these 125
experiments were without exception in a neighborhood of the high income steady state at
iteration 250. Table 1 reports the results for experiment set Aa sa function of x(0).
4.3 Experiment set B: long-run behavior
4.3.1 Eventual attraction to the high income steady state
While initial attraction to a neighborhood of the low income steady state is likely for
preindustrial economies—economies with low initial values for x(0)—both intuition and the
results for experiment set B (given below) can be used to establish that these systems will
17Table 1
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Table 1: Experiment set A consists of 625 experiments, one for each combination of initial
conditions. The table lists results as a functionofx(0) only. For low values of x(0), the low
income steady state is observed at model time 250 regardless ofother initial conditions.
eventually be attracted to aneighborhood of the high income steady state with probability
1. The intuition is as follows. Suppose all agents have initially coordinated on the low
income steady state. The constant probability of mutation ptm > 0 implies that agents
will sometimes be experimenting with non—zero investments in training; that is, there will
sometimes be one or more agents who choose 4(t) > 0. How often this occurs depends on
the mutation rate. This experimentation implies that effectivelabor units per unit of time
worked (the average human capital that all agents inherit) will be rising over time. While
the economy remains in the neighborhood of the low income steady state, selection pressure
will work against agents whoinvest in humancapital. The timetheyspendin training lowers
the timethey spend working, andthe return from working more and investing more savings
in physical capital dominates the return from investing in human capital at the low income
steady state. Decision rules that call for positive investments in training do not propagate
and instead are systematically killed off. This keeps the system in a neighborhood of the
low income steady state. Since agents are experimenting with positive amounts of training,
however, the stock of human capital per capita x(t) grows slowly and unevenly until it
eventually becomes large enough so that the rate of return to investing in human capital
is equated with the rate of return to investing in physical capital. At this point, selection
pressure switches because decision rules that call for investing positive amounts of time in
training obtain higher fitness than those strings that continue to instruct their owners to
18invest no time in training. Thus strings that call for investing in training propagate, and
the no-training strings are systematically killed off. Eventually, all agents devote afraction
of their time whenyoung to training in aneighborhood of the rate consistent with the high
income steady state. The economy stays in aneighborhood of the high income steady state
forever.
A corollary to this intuition is that initially identical economies that spend an epoch
in the neighborhood of the low income steady state may have radically different dates of
development takeoff. This occurs becausethe exact sequence of mutations that an economy
experiences will determine which country reaches the threshold level of human capital first.
4.3.2 Design of experiment set B
In experiment set B, we verified this intuition by studying the long-run behavior of these
artificial economies computationally. We want to show that these economies always eventu-
ally attain the high income steady state. We also want to study the timing ofdevelopment
takeoffs. To pursue these aims in the starkest possible way, we began each of 15 computa-
tional experimentswith exactlythe sameinitial conditions and all parameters set identically,
including the rate of mutation. The fraction of time devoted to training was zero for all
agents, and the savings fraction was the one that is consistent with the low income steady
state for all agents. The value of k(0) was the one that is consistent with the low income
steady state, and x(0) was set to .01. The only difference between these computational
experiments is that we used a different random number seed for each experiment. We
terminated these experiments when our convergence criterion was met for the high income
steady state. For these experiments, our convergencecriterion was to require Ik* — kj <.001
and ji~~ — ?] <.001, where k and’? are calculated over the last 30 observations.13
4.3.3 Results from experiment set B
Our results from experiment set B verify the intuition given above, as all ofthe economies in
this set of experiments initially remain in the neighborhood of the low income steady state
for hundreds of generations, but eventually transit to a neighborhood of the high income
‘3We limited the number of experiments in this set to 15 mainly to conserve on computation time. The
qualitative resultswere unchangedin a numberofother computationalexperiments which wedid notorganize
into areportable format.
19steady state. The results from experiment sets A and B constitute our claim that this
model can address the fundamental fact of development andeconomic growth documented
by Maddison (1982), namely, that sixteen of today’s most highly developed economies were
once stagnant for centuries.
A time series of what occurs in a typical result from experiment set B is illustrated in
Figure 3, which depicts a development takeoff. The average fraction of young agents’ time
devotedto training is measured on the left axis, while the capital-to-effective labor ratio is
measured on the right axis. The low income steady state values for k and r are indicated
by horizontal lines in the left portion of Figure 3. Agents have initially coordinated on a
neighborhood of the low income steady state (where r = 0) and remained there for the
first 1499 periods, which are not pictured. The economy remains in a neighborhood of the
low income steady state through model time 1625 before it has, through experimentation,
accumulated a sufficiently high stock of human capital. At this point, the rate of return
to investments in human capital reaches that of the rate of return to investments in physi-
cal capital. A development takeoff occurs, and the population of artificial adaptive agents
begins the process of adjusting their decisions for ‘r and 4> accordingly. The economy tran-
sitions to a neighborhood of the high income steady state, indicated by the two horizontal
lines in the right half of Figure 3, where r is now greater than zero. By about model time
1675, the economy can be said to have coordinated on a neighborhood of the high income
steady state.
The remaining experiments in this set produced results qualitatively similar to those
depicted in Figure 3. We checked at every iteration to determine whether our system
had met our convergence criterion for the high income steady state. The mean number of
iterationsat which our convergencecriterion was met was 1,797iterations, with a standard
deviation of 70. The maximum number of iterations for convergence to the high income
steady state was 1,916 and the minimum number of iterations for convergence was 1,657.
Even though all 15 ofthese economies were initially identical and initially coordinated on a
neighborhood of the low income steady state, each nevertheless industrialized at a different
time. Ifwe interpret each generation as aperiod ofroughly 25 years, the standard deviation
of 70 iterations impliesthat a typical difference in the date at which the high income steady
state is achieved across societies according to these experiments is about 1,750 years. This
20figure is too large to apply directly to the international experience as we know it, but it
does suggest that in this model there is the possibility of a very wide disparity in the time it
takesfor countries to industrialize, even when countries all begin the process withexactly the
same initial conditions. We want to emphasize this feature as an interesting property of the
model, and caution against taking any particular calculation too seriously. The disparity
in dates of industrialization could be reduced or increased, for instance, by either reducing
or increasing the constant’rate of mutation used, or by reducing or increasing the value of
x(0) 14
Figure 4 illustrates the different timing of the development takeoff for 6 of the 15 artifi-
cial economies in experiment set B. We only show sixeconomies in order to reduce clutter.
This figure plots the average r value in each of these 6 economies from iteration 1400
through iteration 1916, when the last of the 15 artificial economies met our convergence
criterion for the high income steady state. All economies in experiment set B were in a
neighborhood of the low income steady state for the first 1399 iterations. The develop-
ment takeoff is illustrated as the movement of average r from a neighborhood of the low
income steady state value, r = 0, to a neighborhood of the high income steady state value,
r ~ .22. Beginning at the low income steady state, human capital per capita rises slowly
and haphazardly across economies, since there is little private incentive to accumulate it.
Because experimentation is a stochastic process, some economies reach the threshold level
of human capital per capita before others; these countries industrialize rapidly and enjoy
high growth subsequently. Other countries reach the threshold level of human capital per
capita in duecourse, but perhaps considerably later than the first group ofcountries. These
countries then industrialize and eventually enjoy high growth, but their level of per capita
income will be significantly lower than that of the countries that industrialized earlier, and
will remain lower even though the countries that industrializedlater have achieved the high
income rate of growth. We can interpret the different timing of the development takeoffs
that is illustrated in Figure 4a sbeing due to the different beliefs that agents have over
time in the different economies about how much to invest in human and physical capital.
‘4Perhaps more importantly, we are following Azariadis and Drazen (1990) in abstracting from the pos-
sibility that labor or ideas or both can move across economies. We expect that a model including some
degree of human capital mobility would mitigate the sharp disparities in dates of industrialization that we
find. From this point ofview, the results we obtain are perhaps reasonable for a world ofcompletely isolated
societies.
21The larger the amount of experimentation with nonzero investments in human capital, the
faster a nation is able to reach the threshold level of human capital that is necessary for a
development takeoff.
Differences in dates of industrialization can potentially go along way toward explaining
the differences in levels of per capita income across countries that we observe today. Con-
sider a stylized calculation patterned after the model of this paper. There are two steady
states, one with no growth in per capita income and onewith a growth rate of 1.6 percent
per year. There are two countries, A and B, both initially in the low growth equilibrium.
Countries switch between steady states abruptly and without any transition time. Country
A achieves the high growth steady state in the year 1750, while country B achieves the
high growth steady state in 1960. If this is the situation, the ratio of per capita income in
country A relative to country Bi n1960 would be about 28.5. Both countries would grow
at the same rate from 1960 through 1985, and so this ratio would remain constant. This
is roughly consistent with the findings of Parente and Prescott (1993). This calculation is
only meant to be illustrative, but we think it is suggestive that a two steady state model
with learning providing a transition between the steady states can help address some of the
main facts in economic development.
5 Remarks
Our modified version of an endogenous growth model is consistent with several broad de-
velopment and growth facts. The modification we study is to introduce learning, which
serves to select among equilibria and also provides a transition dynamic between station-
ary equilibria. We find that for low initial levels of human capital per capita—levels that
tend to characterize preindustrial economies—and regardless of other initial conditions, the
economies we study are initially attracted to the low income steady state of the model and
can remain there for long periods of time. Eventually, however, these economies achieve a
high development state. These results are consistent with a fundamental development fact
documented by Maddison (1982): today’s leading industrialized nations were all growing
at zero or near zero rates for centuries prior to the industrial revolution in Europe. Fur-
thermore, in this model a development takeoff can occur at a radically different times for
22two economies with identical initial conditions. These economies both eventually grow at
the same mean rate, according to this model, but the level of per capita income will be sig-
nificantly different in the two countries and will remain so indefinitely. This helps account
for another fundamental development fact documented by Parente and Prescott (1993) and
others: the level of per capita income is higher in the richest five percent of the countries
relative to the poorest five percent by a factor of 29, and furthermore, this factor has been
constant from 1960 through 1985.
There are a number of possible extensions that could be made to the basic model that
we have developed in this paper. One extension would be to consider neighborhood effects
(see, e.g. Durlauf (1995)),that is, one could allow different, neighboring countries (different
populations of artificial agents) to exchange ideas (decision rules) about how much to save
and how much to invest in human capital. If one nation had, for example, a greater
propensity to experiment with human capital investments than another, the exchange of
ideas might have the effect of increasing the stock of human capital in the country with
the lower propensity to experiment, and thus speed up the development process in that
country. Such neighborhood effects might explain, forexample, whymost of western Europe
developed within the half century following the industrial revolution in Great Britain. A
second extension might be to include more than one threshold level for human capital
accumulation. The purpose of this exercise would be to ascertain whether the country that
was first to achieve the first threshold level for human capital (say, for example, Great
Britain), would necessarily be the same country that was the first to achieve the second
threshold level for human capital. We leave these extensions to future research.
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Set genetic algorithm parameters.
Find equilibria numerically: (r, k) and (r~,k~).
Initialize tensors and accumulation variables.
Initialize k, x.
For replications=1 to maximum replications,
Initialize strings;
Find implied values of ‘y, w, r for t = —2;
Find implied initial old aggregate savings;
Find implied values of k, ‘y, w, r, z for t = —1;
Find implied initial young aggregate savings;
Find implied values of k, ‘y, w, r, x for t = 0;
For time=1 to maximum time,
Find fitness of the old generation;
Find fitness of the young generation;
Create newborn generation: for member=1 to generation size,
Apply reproduction operator via tournament selection;
Apply crossover and mutation operators;
End creation loop;
Find aggregate savings of newborn generation;
Find values of k, ‘y, w, r, x for time t;
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All economies in neighborhood of low income steady state for thefirst 1399 observations.
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Figure 4
Six artificial economies industrialize.